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Time brings about a change of conditions, whether such
change is as to labor-saving machinery, some new scientific
theory, or of a refutation or adoption of some legal doctrine or
proposition.
The layman presented with the early common law indict-
ment would be so lost in a maze of "thereofs, wherewiths and
wherefores" that he would be unable to understand the con-
tents of so sacred a document, for so it was regarded. This ver-
bose instrument was defective if it failed to have a certain num-
ber of words, brevity being unknown. The one who produced
the longest indictment, filled with "herewiths and therefores"
was considered the best pleader of his case. If the purpose of
the indictment is to serve the accused, should he be left won-
dering, after he has read or had read to him a document con-
taining as much as four thousand words, why he is before the
tribunal of justice!
The indictment was originally an oral and informal state-
ment by the grand-jury, taken down by the clerk of the court
from the lips of the foreman, and recorded on the court rolls.
In the time of Edward I, the jury was required by statute to
make its presentments in writing, and from that time the indict-
ment acquired a set, formal structure.1
Because of the judges favoring life in capital cases, they
were quick to grasp the advantage of some technical defect and
in that way discharge the accused; therefore, the form of the
indictment became very important.
On account of this attitude of the courts toward indict-
ments, pleaders in drawing allegations introduced facts which
could, by any possibility be deemed essential; if they were use-
less they would do no harm, and if necessary, their omission
would vitiate the indictment. Indictments therefore, became
filled with allegations which had been introduced from the sport,
the stupidity, or the abundant caution of some pleader, and
were retained because there was some risk in omitting and none
in retaining them.2 Because of this condition, many allegations
were introduced and many facts inserted in the indictment
which were not needed or necessary to be put in, but were facts
1Beale's Criminal Pleading and Practice, p. 80.
2 Beale's Criminal Pleading and Practice, p. 81.
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and matters that would be and were brought in as evidence dur-
ing the course of the trial.
Dean Wigmore has the following to report on the case of
People v. Hunt.3 The indictment charged plaintiffs in error
with the larceny of Fifty-five Dollars of good and lawful money
of the United States of the value of $55, and the excuse stated
in the indictment for failing to describe the property stolen is
that a more particular description of the money was to the
grand-jurors unknown. The uncontradicted evidence is that a
more particular description of the money alleged to have been
stolen was given to the grand jury by the prosecuting witness.
He testified before the grand jury that there were five ten-dollar
bills and a five-dollar bill. This* assignment of error presents
the only question which requires our consideration.
A man is charged with larceny; is he guilty? It does not
matter, since that is not the issue. The real issue is, Did the
grand jurors know more facts than they put down in their in-
dictment? But did that mislead the accused? Was not the re-
ported testimony on record in the trial so plain that he could
run no risk of being charged again with" the larceny of the same
$55 ? No matter. Was not the recorded testimony so plain that
the court could see whether the facts supported the judgment?
The question is, Did the indicting jurors (nobody knows who
or where they are now) on a certain day know a little more than
they told?
Some of the early English indictments are so far-fetched
and beyond the sphere of comprehension, they present to the
defendant a world of words with no meaning. At least some
legal training is necessary to understand what the document pur-
ports to be. The following are some of the early English indict-
ments :4 "The Jurors for our Lady the Queen present That H. S.
formerly of S in the County of E. Tailor, and W. C. of S. in
the County of E. aforesaid, Weaver, on the first day of March
in the fourth year of the reign of our Lady Elizabeth, of Eng-
land, France and Ireland, Queen, Defender of the Faith, at C.
in the Parish of S. aforesaid in the County of E. aforesaid, with
force and arms in and upon one T. B. in the peace of God and
36 Ill. Law Rev. 411, 96 N. E. 220 (1911).
4 (These indictments were taken from William West's Symbole-
ography.) American Bar Association Journal, article by W. Renwick
Riddell, at page 683 (1927).
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of our said Lady the Queen then and there did make an assault
and the said H. W. with a certain salcastrum in English called a
Welsh Hook of the value of twelve pence which he the said T. B.
on the right arm near the right hand then and there felonously
struck, giving then and there to the said T. B. a mortal wound
of the depth of two inches and the length of five inches of which
certain mortal wound the said T. then and there instantly
died. And so the said H. W. and W. C. at S. aforesaid in the
County of E. aforesaid in manner and form aforesaid, the said
T. B. feloniously and of their malice aforesaid-thought did kill
and murder against the peace of our Lady, now Queen, her
Crown and dignity."
"The Jurors for our Lady the Queen present That T. L.
formerly of W. in the County of C., Labourer, not having God
before his eyes but seduced by instigation of the Devil, on the
30th day of April in the 8th year of the reign of Elizabeth
Queen of England about the ninth hour of the said day at W.
aforesaid by force and arms and of his malice aforethought in
and upon a certain M. being then and there in the Queen's peace
did make an assault and with a certain club of the value of four-
pence which then and there he held in his hands he did beat,
wound and ill treat. So that the said M. from the said 30th day
of April in the year aforesaid till the fifth day of May then next
following languished and upon the said fifth day of May the
said M. at W. aforesaid of the said beating wounding and ill
treating then and there died. And so the said T. the said M. in
manner aforesaid, that is to say at W. aforesaid on the day and
year aforesaid feloniously and willfully did slay and murder
against the peace of our said Lady the Queen, her Crown and
dignity."
Both of these indictments used too many words to attain
their ends. The form became so stilted that to deviate from that
form meant a fatal error. Even with the passing of years, the
states of America have done little to do away with such a form.
An Iowa case has the following indictment :5 "The Grand Jury
of the County of Sioux, and State of Iowa, in name and by the
authority of the State of Iowa, accuse James A. of the crime of
murder in the first degree, committed as follows: The said
James A. at the County Sioux, and State of Iowa, on the 22nd
a State v. Andrews, 84 Iowa 88, 50 N. W. 549 (1891).
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day of Aug. 1888 A. D. feloniously, willfully, deliberately, pre-
meditatedly and of his malice aforethought, in and upon 6he
Charles C., then and there being, did make an assault, and that
he, the said James A., then and there, with a certain deadly
weapon, being a revolver, then and there charged and loaded
with gunpowder and one leaden bullet, which said revolver he
the said James A., in his hands then and there had and held
then and there feloniously, willfully, deliberately, l'remedi-
tatedly and of his malice aforethought did discharge and shoot
off, to, against and upon the said Charles C., and that the said
James A., with the leaden bullet aforesaid, out of the revolver
aforesaid, then and there by force of the gunpowder aforesaid,
by the said James A., discharged and shot off as aforesaid, then
and there feloniously, willfully, deliberately, premeditatedly,
and of his malice aforethought did strike, penetrate and wound
him the said Charles C., in and upon the left side of the belly
of him the said, Charles C., giving to him, the said Charles C.,
then and there, with the leaden bullet aforesaid, so as aforesaid
discharged and shot out of the revolver aforesaid by the said
James A., in and upon the left side of the belly of him, the said
Charles C., one mortal wound of the 'depth of twelve inches and
of the breadth of half an inch, of which said mortal wound the
said Charles C., from the 22 day of Aug. A. D. 1888 to the 23
day of Aug. A. D. 1888 aforesaid, at the town of H. in the
county and state aforesaid did suffer and languish, and lang-
uishing did live. On which said 23 day of Aug. A. D. 1888 afore-
said, in the year aforesaid, in the county and state aforesaid, the
said Charles C., of the said mortal wound, died. And so the
jurors aforesaid upon their oaths do say that he, the said James
A., him the said Charles C., in the manner and form aforesaid,
feloniously, willfully, deliberately, premeditatedly and of his
malice aforethought, did kill and murder contrary to the form
of the statute in such cases made and provided and against the
peace and dignity of the State of Iowa."
Comparing this indictment with the two English indict-
ments, we find that there is very little difference. The wording
of all of them could have been diminished threefold and they
would yet have conveyed the same meaning, and been much
more easily understood. We are all agreed as to the purpose of
the indictment, i. e., that it is to acquaint the accused with the
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crime with which he is charged. For example, suppose that he
is charged with the crime of rape. In order to commit the crime
of rape, at common law the male must be over the age of four-
teen, and he must carnally know a female person, not his wife
without her consent. When he is so charged in the indictment,
is it necessary that the indictment acquaint the accused with his
own age at the time of the act, and must it further allege that
the female person was not his wife? Even though these facts
should be alleged or set forth in the indictment, they in no way
would aid the accused in preparing himself for his defense.6
"In favor of life great strietnesses have been in all times
required in points of indictments, and the truth is, that it is
grown to be a blemish and inconvenience in the law, and the
administration thereof; more offenders escape by the over-easy
ear given to exceptions in indictments, than by their own inno-
cence, and many times gross murders, burglaries, robberies and
other heinous and crying offenses, escape by these unseemly
niceties to the reproach of the law, to the shame of the govern-
ment, and to the encouragement of villany, and to the dishonour
of God.' '7
There can be no trial s conviction,9 or punishment for a
crime without a formal and sufficient accusation. In the absence
thereof, the court acquires no jurisdiction whatever,' 0 and if it
assumes jurisdiction a trial and conviction are a nullity. But
should the formal accusation be so verbose and prolix that the
average man would be confused with its meaning? Such formal
accusation is to put the accused on notice of the crime he is
charged with, and nothing more. The indictment for murder,
as found in Ontario, Canada,1 1 seems far more adequate than the
6People v. Trumbley, 252 Ill. 29, 96 N. E. 573 (1911). The court
would not support a judgment of conviction because the indictment
failed to set forth the accused's age and that the female person was
not his wife.
" Criminal Pleading and Practice, Beale: Sir Matthew Hale in the
17th Century in his "Pleas to the Crown," Vol. 11, page 193.
$Williamson v. State, 1 Ga. App. 657, 57 S. E. 1079 (1907).
9 U. S. v. London, 176 Fed. 976 (1909).
3.0 U. S. v. London, 176 Fed. 976 (1909).
n American Bar Association Journal, "In the Supreme Court of
Ontario. The Jurors for our Lord the King present that A. B. and
C. D. murdered E. F. at Toronto on May 27, 1926." "The prisoners
knew perfectly well what they were accused of, and if they wanted par-
ticulars ...describing the means whereby (the) offense was com-
mitted, all they had to do was to ask for them. Nobody ever did, and
it is not likely that anyone ever will, ask for such particulars."
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Iowa and the English indictments; this indictment sufficiently
charges the accused with the crime. To continue with the long
indictments that were in vogue in the sixteenth -century is a
wasto of time and money. Mr. W. R. Riddell says, "While we
in Canada long adhered to the old traditions and followed the
old forms, we recognize that we were-as we are-too busy and
poor to indulge in or pay for frills, and that courts after all are
business institutions to determine the rights of the people col-
lectively or individually, and that with the least possible expend-
iture of time and money. Accordingly when in 1892 we under-
took to systematize and codify our Criminal Law and Practice,
we cut out what we thought unnecessary, including prolixity of
indictments."
The necessity for the meticulous particularity of such in-
formation in the indictment and the testing of the sufficiency of
such indictment by the technical rules of the common law are
of such a nature thai they sometimes defeat the right they are
supposed to guard by making an indictment so artificial and
complex that it can not be understood by the accused.
The long and verbose indictments were necessary in the
early criminal cases, for the accused was to rely solely upon the
indictment for all the information he was to receive concerning
the crime of which he was charged. However, the accused need
not rely solely on the indictment today, for he has access to the
minutes of the evidence given before the grand jury which will
put him on sufficient notice of the nature of the crime in all its
details.
In the interpretation of a legal document, the interpretors
seek to ascertain the intent with which the document was en-
fered into. If, from the entire document, it is clear what is in-
tended, the instrument is declared to mean just that. In the
interpretation of an indictment the effort is not to find out what
was intended, but to read out of the instrument the meaning
which was obviously intended to be put in.
In Fleming v. Stat 12 the defendant was convicted of the
crime of accepting a deposit in a bank of which he was an officer,
the bank being insolvent at the time. According to the indict-
ment he received the deposit "after the bank was insolvent."
This could not possibly support a conviction in the mind of the
2 62 Tex. Cr. App. 653, 139 S. W. 598 (1911).
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Texas Court because to say he received it "after the bank was
insolvent" is not a sufficient averment that the bank was insolv-
ent at the time he received it.
In State v. Gallagher'3 the defendant had been convicted
of the crime of perjury, the indictment charging the defendant
with having feloniously, "falsely testified in the district court"
in that she swore she never had sexual intercourse with one C. H.
at any time or place, "whereas in truth and in fact defendant
knew that she had sexual intercourse with him at divers times
and places." The Supreme Court of Iowa held this indictment
insufficient to support the coivietion because it failed to aver
that she had had intercourse with C. H.
In Marsh v. State'4 the defendant was convicted under a
statute making it grand larceny to steal "a cow or animal of the
cow kind." The evidence disclosed that the defendant stole a
steer, whereupon the court declared that the defendant could
not be convicted under the statute because a steer is a male and.
hence not "of the cow kind."
In Keser v. Commonwealth'5 D. was convicted under an
indictment which charged that she "did unlawfully and wilfully
receive and appropriate money and other things of value from
N. G., a prostitute, and from the earnings of her prostitution."
This conviction was reversed because the indictment failed to
aver that the unlawful receiving was "without lawful consid-
eration."
In State v. Harris'6 D., who had been convicted of stealing
a pair of shoes, was able to have his conviction reversed because
the proof showed he stole two shoes, both for the right foot, and
hence not a pair.
In Prichard v. People 7 the indictment for bigamy was held
insufficient to support a conviction in spite of the proof that the
defendant had committed the crime, because the indictment
13123 Iowa 378, 98 N. W. 906 (1904), Mr. Justice McClain said,
"I do not believe that the interests of justice require a preservation
of technical rules of pleading which relate to mere matters of form,
and not of substance. . . . I cannot concur therefore, with the
majority in the reversal of the case for insufficiency of the indictment."
14 3 Ala. App. 80, 57 So. 387 (1912).
15210 Ky. 383, 275 S. W. 886 (1925).
163 Har. 559 (Del., 1841).11149 Ill. 50, 36 N. E. 103 (1894).
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failed to charge that the first wife was living at the time of the
second marriage.
-In Lemons v. State'1 the indictment concluded, "against
the peace and dignity of the State of W. Virginia" the convic-
tion was reversed because of this conclusion. The constitution
of the state provided the form, "against the peace and dignity
of the State of West (and not "W.") Virginia.
"No consideration of the modern sacrifice of justice upon
the altar of formalism would be complete without mention of
the famous "The" case in Missouri.19 In Siate v. Campbell, D
was convicted on the charge of rape. He appealed, basing his
appeal on the ground of the defective conclusion of the indict-
ment-"Against the peace and dignity of State". The Supreme
Court of Missouri held it to be a reversible error to omit the
word "the" from the conclusion.
In all of the foregoing cases there has been a trial and con-
viction of the accused-Why ? Because the evidence in the case
has been so strong, either a preponderance of the evidence or
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, passed upon by twelve com-
petent jurors, but still that was not sufficient to warrant the
affirmance of the conviction. In all of these.cases there has been
a reversal of the conviction because of some slip in the indict-
ment, which in no way misled the accused.
If we retain the same views we will be acting contrary to
what Murray, C. J., said ;20 that is, we will continue to main-
tain the old technical rules and frills which hamper justice in-
stead of aiding it. If we are to administer justice we are to
allow the interpretors of the indictment a wider range, and
allow them to endeavor to ascertain the meaning and intent of
the instrument.
24 W. Va. 755 (1870).
1Htate v. Campbell, 210 Mo. 202, 109 S. W. 807 (1908).
*People v. Aro, 6 California 207 (1856), Murray, C. T., said, "The
main object (of the legislature in the adoption of the criminal code)
to be obtained by them was the simplification of practice and plead-
Ing in criminal cases by removing the rubbish and unmeaning tech-
nicalities resorted to and invented by the judges in England to shield
the accused against the rigor of punishment, which though sanctioned
by law, was relaxed by the humanity of the bench, and which, so far
from accomplishing the end proposed, was found to defeat justice, by




We have seen the "indictment" situation as it existed at
the early common law, and which is followed at the present time
by a majority of the jurisdictions in America. The technicali-
ties have caused reversals of convictions which otherwise would
have punished the offender for the crime with which he was
charged. A number of the jurisdictions are awakening to the
fact, that if justice is to be done, the absurd technicalities must
be put back with the "has been" law.
One of the states that has awakened "judicially" to this
fact is Illinois, which is aptly pointed out by the case of People
v. Graves.21 The indictment charged that the defendant stole
"one Ford radiator, one Chevrolet radiator, and two Dodge
radiators". Following the early mode of procedure, the de-
fendant moved for a new trial and in arrest of judgment on the
ground that the omission of the word "automobile" in the de-
scription made the indictment insufficient. It was held that the
indictment was sufficiently certain in that "it is a common prac-
tice to designate an automobile part by its generic name in con-
junction with the trade name of the car, omitting the word
"automobile". . . Few, if any, persons would fail to under-
stand the indictment."
Using this case as a basis for the comparison of the cases
cited above, we are met with the bold fact that this case repre-
sents a radical change in the judicial attitude. The common
law attitude toward indictments was one of extreme technicality
and a bar to the administration of justice. The most technical
and frivolous objections to indictments have been allowed to
prevail in many jurisdictions. The famous "pair of boots"
case, 22 the "The" decision 23 and the "W. Virginia" 24 decision
are outstanding examples of the extremes of judicial rulings in
construing the sufficiency of the indictment.
Under the common law indictments the conviction of "the
accused could be reversed, if the indictment failed to have a
formal conclusion. In a number of the states this common law
conclusion was crystalized into a constitutional provision that
-162 N. E. 839 (Il1., 1928).
" State v. Harris, supra, n. 16.
State v. Campbel, supra, n. 19.
"Lemons v. State, supra, n. 18.
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every indictment shall conclude against the peace and dignity
of the State.25 Indictments under a statute, in addition to the
crystalized conclusion, needed to conclude with "against the
form of the specific statute" to show that it is based upon a
statute, or it would be held fatally defective as an indictment
under the statute.2 6
Centuries ago when the criminal law was being made by the
judges, when the protection afforded by modern constitutional
guarantees did not exist, and when there was no appeal from
the verdict of a jury, it was necessary that the indictment should
set out the specific facts constituting the crime with the greatest
particularity to prevent men from being tried and convicted for
acts which were not crimes at all. Today, where the procedure
so carefully safeguards the defendant, and where each crime is
defined by statute and judicial decisions, there is no need for re-
versals on such frivolous technicalities. If cases are still to be
reversed on the mechanical precedents, .one may well feel that
judicial perversity in the application of technicalities is in-
curable.
"The need of today is not so much to save offenders from
punishment, as to protect society from wrongdoers; therefore
it is no longer necessary to provide excuses for reversing convic-
tions of those who are obviously guilty. The safeguarding of
the innocent from wrongful conviction still remains. In the
early criminal cases the defendant was forced to rely upon the
indictment for all the information he was to receive relative to
the charge against him, prior to the trial itself. In felony cases,
he was originally not entitled to a copy of the indictment nor
even permitted to read it himself, but merely to have it read to
him. Under such procedure it required the utmost precision in
the charge. And if a judge occasionally went further and re-
quired the indictment to include some mere evidentiary fact, it
was not because this was require by good pleading, but rather
because a humane impulse had been forced to crack a piece of
judicial machinery which would not yield otherwise to the
administration of justice in the particular case."127
2 American Law Institute, Code of Criminal Procedure, No. 1,
Sec. 450.
2McUullough v. Commonwealth, 3 Ky. 95 (1807).
114 Iowa Law Review 129.
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The indictment need no longer be verbose and prolix for
the accused is entitled to the minutes of the evidence given be-
fore the grand jury and a bill of particulars. "If the accusa-
tion is stated in the simplest possible form . . . (it) would seem
to give the defendant all the information he is entitled to under
the constitution, (and) all he needs for the proper preparation
of his defense." 28
We have seen that the object and purpose of an indictment
is to inform the defendant of the nature of the offense with
which he stands charged, and for which he is to be tried. The
argument for the support of the early indictment is that the
defendant could look only to the indictment to ascertain what
the facts are to which he is to answer. The indictment must,
:therefore, set forth the offense with such degree of certainty as
will apprise the defendant of the nature of the particular accu-
sation on which he is to be tried, and as will enable him to plead
the indictment and judgment thereon in bar of any subsequent
prosecution for the same offense. A general averment that the
accused had committed a particular crime named without more
specific allegations was insufficient, for no one could know what
defense to make to a charge which was uncertain. The defend-
ant would not know what evidence he might be called upon to
meet, and could not properly prepare his defense. There would
be no way to determine whether the facts given in evidence
were the same as those of which he is accused; and an acquittal
or conviction under such general accusation, could not be
pleaded in bar of another prosecution, for it could not be de-
termined whether the accusations were the same; and so a de-
fendant might be twice punished for the same offense. It was
therefore insufficient to charge in an indictment for murder
merely that the defendant "did unlawfully' willfully, mali-
ciously, and of his malice aforethought kill and murder" a cer-
tain named person, "against the peace and dignity of the com-
monwealth. ' "
This was well and good in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, but today the defendant has a right to demand the
nature and particulars of the crime with which he is charged.
This right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation
would be valueless unless it also included the obligation on the
"Atate v. Burch, 199 Iowa 221, 200 N. W. 442.(1924).
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part of the state to furnish information upon such demand.
This right is given to the accused, irrespectite of whether the
nature of the case requires for a fair trial that he receive that
information in writing in the particular case. He must be given
specific information even though he knows all the facts and cir-
cumstances necessary to assure him a fair trial. The right to
be informed of the nature of the accusation means that the
charge must specify some offense. 'The decisions state that a
formal charge specifying the offense is an absolute prerequisite
to the jurisdiction of the court.29 It cannot be waived by the
accused. The constitution provides an absolute requirement-
namely, that the charge must contain sufficient matter to iden-
tify the offense. The right to be informed of the cause of the
accusation means that the charge must specify the transaction
which constitutes the offense. If the charge does not contain
sufficient averments to identify the transaction and so enable
the accused to prepare his defense as to the facts, he has the
right to compel the prosecution to furnish him with such infor-
mation as is desirable for that purpose. This is done by giving
him the right to a bill of particulars. At common law the bill
of particulars was given to the accused as a matter of grace on
the part of the trial court to supplement the information con-
tained in the indictment. The appellate courts will not review
the action of the trial court in granting or refusing the bill
except in cases of gross abuse of the discretion. The reason
was that the indictment was considered as fully identifying both
the offense and the transaction constituting the offense. The-
oretically, the accused never needed any information not con-
tained in the indictment for a fair trial.30
The theory as to the objection that the charge was so in-
definite (when it failed to be verbose and prolix) that the
accused could not plead the record and conviction in bar of an-
other prosecution, which was so firmly imbedded in the common
law, has led to more absurd decisions than almost any other. It
is chiefly responsible for the rule that the indictment must state
all the ingredients of the offense. It is also responsible for those
decisions which held that if one is indicted for stealing a white
: U. S. v. London, 176 Fed. 976, "In the absence (of the indict-
ment) the court acquires no jurisdiction whatever."
" Sherri;c v. State, 167 Ind. 345, 79 N. E. 193 (1906).
M. L. J.-12
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horse belonging to A and the jury finds that the horse which
he stole from A was a black one, he must be released. The rea-
son is this-if he afterwards were indicted for stealing the black
horse and pleaded that he had once been convicted thereof, he
could not prove his plea, because on referring to the first indict-
ment, it would be seen that he was there charged with stealihg
a white horse. If the man was convicted of stealing A's horse
and served his sentence, no one would ever think of prosecuting
him again for stealing the same horse, no matter whether it was
called a white horse or a black one in the first indictment. This
objection can be eliminated without prejudice to the essential
rights of the defendant, and all such rights can be preserved by
providing simply that in case of a second indictment the entire
proceedings of the first trial may be examined for the purpose
of knowing just what was decided. Wit this elimination there
would go one of the reasons for saying that the indictment must
contain all the ingredients of the offense. And furthermore, it
is the right of the accused to resort to parol testimony to show
the subject matter of the former conviction and such practice
is not infrequently necessary.
It is obvious that no person can be convicted of murder in
the first degree unless it be proved that he killed with deliber-
ate premeditation. It is therefore certain that under the com-
mon law rules of pleading,31 and most definitions of essential
elements, 32 deliberate premeditation should be charged in any
indictment for murder in the first degree, as an essential element
of the offense. An indictment need not allege all the essential
elements of the offense in order to be constitutional. The indict-
ment which contains sufficient matter to enable the accused to
prepare his defense, is constitutional. In the cases of Newcomb
v. State,33 and State v. Schne l,34 the couzts held that an indict-
"State v. Aiirews, 84 Iowa 85 (1891).
Z White v. Com., 9 Bush 178 (1872). It is insufficient to charge
in an indictment for murder merely that the defendant "did unlaw-
fully, willfully, maliciously, feloniously, and of his malice aforethought
kill and murder" a certain named person, "against the peace and
dignity of the Com. of Ky." Adams Express Co. v. Com., 177 Ky. 499(1917). And with respect to stating the offense, every material fact
and circumstance which serves to constitute the offense charged, must
be averred and set forth in the indictment with precision and cer-
tainty. If any material fact or circumstance be omitted, the indict-
ment will be bad.
337 Miss. 383 (1859).24 W. Va. 767 (1884).
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ment need only show the nature of the accusation. The cause
may be learned by the accused elsewhere, -and the proposal is to
inform him of the cause by a bill of particulars. In the ease of
Bartell v. U. S.,35 Day, J., said, "It is elementary that an indict-
ment, in order to be good under the Federal Constitution and
laws, shall advise the accused of the nature and cause of the
accusation and prepare him for his trial and that after judg-
ment, he may be able to plead the record and judgment in bar
of further prosecution for the same offense.?'
The Massachusetts cases treat the bill of particulars as part
of the formal charge, and the indictment and the bill of particu-
lars together are valid if they contain sufficient matter to satisfy
the constitutional requirements.3 6 Therefore, the indictment,
such as is used in Ontario,37 and the bill of particulars, can be
pleaded in bar of another prosecution; and in this manner do
away with the long, verbose, early common law indictments by
which the accused was not punished but his guilt was "white-
washed" with technicalities.
PRESENT SITUATION IN KENTUCKY
The State of Kentucky is still following the old common
law form of indictment, whose watchword is "verboseness". It
has been repeatedly held by the Kentucky courts, that where the
indictment fails to allege the particulars of the offense, such an
indictment must fail. The offense of which the defendant is
sought to be charged, must be stated; and every material fact
and circumstance which serves to constitute the offense. charged
must be averred and set forth in the indictment, with precision
and certainty. If any material fact or circumstance be omitted,
the indictment will fail.38
In Elliott v. Commonweaith3 9 the court said, "It has never
been held in any case that certainty in stating the offense
-227 U. S. 427 (1913).14 Comm. v. Kefly, 184 Mass. 320, 68 N. E. 346 (1903).
17 "In the Supreme Court of Ontario, The Jurors for our Lord the
King present That A. B. and C. D. murdered E. F., at Toronto on May
27, 1926." W. Renwick Riddell said, "The prisoners knew perfectly
well what they were accused of, and if they wanted particulars...
describing the means whereby (the) offense was committed, all they
had to do was to ask for them. Nobody ever did, and it is not likely
that anyone ever will, ask for such particulars."
'
8 Adams Ex. Co. v. Cor., 177 Ky. 449 (1917).
1194 Ky. 576 (1922).
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charged in an indictment would dispense with the necessity and
required certainty in stating the particular circumstances of the
offense charged; nor that certainty in stating the particular cir-
cuniAances constituting the offense charged would dispense with
the required certainty in stating the offense of which the de-
fendant is accused."
In Brooks v. Commonwealth40 the court held, "The particu-
lav circumstances of suffering and permitting gaming upon the
premises of the defendant are with sufficient certainty and di-
rectness stated in the indictment; but that does not supersede or
dispense with the other requirements, equally imperative, that
the indictment shall be direct and certain as to the offense
charged. "
The holding in Brooks v. Commonwealth is supported by
the opinions in Commonwealth v. Tobin,4 ' Commonwealth v.
Castlemao, 42 Bennett v. Commonwealth,43 and Commonwealth
v. Reynolds.44 "To dispense with the necessity of requiring an
indictment to be direct and certain as to the offense charged, and
the necessity of naming an offense, would be to dispense with a
requirement of the statute which is mandatory and to dispense
with a necessity to orderly and safe procedure in prosecutions
for crimes and misdemeanors."
SPECIFIC RECONME NDATIONS FOR KENTUCKY
We have seen the object and purpose of the indictment, and
the advantages afforded by the short form of indictment. The
query in this section is, should Kentucky adopt the short form
of indictment, and are there any constitutional or statutory
problems involved?
It is the opinion of this writer that the Legislature of Ken-
tucky should pass a statute repealing or amending the present
Sections 122 and 124 of the Kentucky Criminal Code, by which
the short form of indictment would be adopted. Sections 122
and 124 of the Kentucky Criminal Code read as follows:
Sec. 122. Requisites of and Indictment.-The indictment must con-
tain: The title of the prosecution, specifying the name of the court in
4098 Ky. 143 (1895).
140 Ky. 261 (1910).
48 Ky. L. R. 608 (1887).
"150 Ky. 604 (1912).
"4 Ky. L. R. 623 (1883).
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which the indictment is presented, and the nanies of the parties; a
statement of the acts constituting the offense, in ordinary and concise
language, and in such a manner as to enable a person of common
understanding to know what is intended; and with such degree of cer-
tainty as to enable the court to pronounce judgment on conviction,
according to the right of the case.
Sec. 124. Facts concerning which it must be direct and certain.
The indictment must be direct and certain as regards:
The party charged;
The offense charged;
The county in which the offense was committed;
The particular circumstances of the offense charged if they be
hecessary to constitute a complete offense.
Subsection 4 of Section 124 would apparently lead one to be-
lieve that an indictment not in detailed form is sufficient, but
upon examining the cases 45 it will be found that the courts hold
that it would be insufficient and defective.
It lies within the power of the legislature of the state to
pass an act adopting the short form of indictment, as suggested
by the American Law Institute Code of Criminal Procedure,
46
as follows:
In the (here state the name of the court) the day of .......................
19 .... The state (Commonwealth, People) of ................ v. A. B.
The grand jurors of the county of. ........................ accuse A. B. of
(here state the offense, e. g., murder, asault with intent to kill, poison-
ing an animal contrary to Section 31 of the Penal Code), and
charge that (here the particulars of the offense may be added with a
view to avoiding the necessity for a bill of particulars).
See. 159. The indictment may charge, and is valid and sufficient
if it charges the offense for which the accused is being prosecuted in
one or more of the following ways:
1. By using the name given to the offense by the common law or
by a statute.
2. By stating so much of the definition of the offense, either in
terms of the common law or of the statute defining the offense or in
terms of substantially the same meaning, as is sufficient to give the
court and the accused notice of what offense is intended to be charged.
By this form of indictment, the accused will not be allowed a
reversal of a conviction on some frivolous ground, as has been
pointed out above. By adopting this short form of indictment
by means of a legislative act, the accused cannot bring in a plea
to the effect that the indictment is unconstitutional. There is no
15Elliott v. Commonwealth, supra, n. 39; Brooks v. Commonwealth,
supra, n. 40; Commonwealth v. Tobin, supra, n. 41; Commonwealth v.
Castleman, supra, n. 42; Bennett v. Commonwealth, supra, n. 43; Com-
monwealth v. Reynolds, supra, n. 44.
"Vol. I, Sec. 157.
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constitutional impediment hindering its adoption, and there is
no need for a constitutional amendinent. Sections 11 and 12 of
the Kentucky Constitution read as follows: Sec. 11, "In all
criminal prosecutions the accused has the right. . . to demand
the nature and cause of the accusation against him." See. 12,
"No person for an indictable offense, shall be proceded against
criminally by information, except. . .". These are the only
two sections in the Kentucky Constitution which deal with the
indictment.
The Constitution does not provide that the accused must be
presented with a long detailed indictment; however, it does pro-
vide that the defendant does have the right to "demand the
nature an cause of the accusation against him." Therefore, if
-the accused should be presented with the following indictment,
"The grand jury of Fayette County, in the name and by the
authority of the Commonwealth of Kentucky,, finds that John Doe
murdered Richard Roe in Lexington, May 1, 1930."
he could not enter a plea to quash or demur to the indictment,
because of its unconstitutionality. For the constitution pro-
vides, inferentially, that if the indictment does not allege the
acts constituting the offense, he can demand the nature and
cause of the offense, by asking for a bill of particulars.
It may sometimes happen, from the nature of the case, that
even a good indictment may fail to particularize the acts relied
upon to constitute the offense charged, so as to fully and fairly
put the accused upon notice as to what will be attempted to be
proved against him on trial, so that he may be prepared to meet
it with evidence. This may occur where the charge in the indict-
ment is so general or indefinite as not to disclose the particular
acts or transaction which would be asserted against him in the
evidence as criminal. But the way of reactiing the matter is not
by demurrer, but by a bill of particulars.
A motion for a bill of particulars should be accompanied
by the affidavit of the party making it, pointing out the particu-
lars desired; but unless a bill of particulars is demanded, there
would be no reason for requiring it.
A bill of particulars is not designed to uphold an indict-
ment that is insufficient, but is designed to be used only where
the indictment is sufficient upon demurrer, and in furtherance
of justice in order to safeguard the constitutional rights of the
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accused and .to enable him to fully understand the crime and
prepare his defense 47 when the charge in the indictment is in
general terms.48
By adopting the short form of indictment, the constitu-
tional provisions which do not provide that the indictment
should contain the acts constituting the offense, will not be vio-
lated. It is submitted, therefore, that the Legislature adopt
this method of procedure so that the purpose for which the in-
dictment was intended may be carried out in a direct, simple,
clear, and understandable manner with justice and fairness to
both the accused and the State.
F. J. CARuso.
7Clary v. Com., 163 Ky. 48 (1915).
4sBaile v. Co., 130 Ky. 301 (1908).
